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Gamm: Beyond the Symptoms: Finding the Root Cause of the Chaotic Taraso

BEYOND THE SYMPTOMS: FINDING THE ROOT CAUSE OF THE
CHAOTIC TARASOFF LAWS
Taylor Gamm*

I. INTRODUCTION
On July 19, 2010, James Holmes entered a movie theater in Denver,
Colorado.1 He purchased a ticket for a showing of “The Dark Knight
Rises” days earlier.2 Soon after the show began, he exited the theater
through a rear door.3 Eighteen minutes into the film, Holmes reentered
theater #9, threw two cans of tear gas into the theater, and opened fire.4
By the time he surrendered to the police, about seven minutes later,
twelve people were left dead and seventy were injured.5
Horrifying events like these typically invoke one question: how could
this have been prevented? In attempting to answer this difficult question
for atrocities, such as those committed by Holmes, people tend to look
to those closest to the killer.6 It is only natural for the nation to wonder
whether anyone had been told of the killer’s plan, whether the victims
could have been warned, or whether any of the people closest to the
killer could have prevented the killer from executing the plan.7
While family members often become the target of these inquiries,
they also have been directed towards the killer’s therapist with some
frequency. Unlike when these suspicions are directed at close family
members, there are massive legal implications for mental health
professionals and their patients. Demonstrably, James Holmes’ therapist,
Lynne Fenton, faced at least one lawsuit by the wife of one of Holmes’
victims, who alleged that Fenton breached her “duty to use reasonable
care to protect the public at large.”8 This was not the first time a
therapist has been the recipient of such an accusation; rather, the Aurora
Shooting lawsuit was the product of a line of cases that began roughly
* Associate Member, 2016-2017, University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. Colorado Theater Shooting Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/19/us/coloradotheater-shooting-fast-facts/ (last updated Nov. 30, 2017).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Kelley Wallace, After mass shootings, do parents shoulder some of the blame? CNN
(October 7, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/07/health/oregon-shooting-parents-blame/. For
example, the parents of the killers in both the Sandy Hook and after the mass shooting in Roseburg,
Oregon, faced a lot of scrutiny for not taking more proactive roles in preventing these disasters. Id.
7. Id.
8. First Amended Complaint at 3, Blunk, v. Fenton, No. 13-cv-00080 (D. Colo. Mar. 25,
2013),2013 WL 1313894.
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fifty years ago.9
In the 1970s, the tragic murder of a young woman and the
accompanying search for an explanation led to a lawsuit that opened the
door to holding therapists liable for the violence of their patients. In
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, the California Supreme
Court held for the first time that the therapist of a murderer could be
liable for failing to warn the victim about potential harm.10 Today,
courts and legislatures remain unsure how to balance the desire to
prevent horrific events like the Aurora Shooting with the need to
preserve the confidential therapist-patient relationship.
This article explores the legal principles behind a therapist’s duty to
protect against their patients’ violence and the reason there is no
consensus across the United States on the issue. To do so, Section II
contains the necessary background information, including relevant tort
principles and details of the infamous Tarasoff case. Section III(A)
summarizes the variant Tarasoff laws; Section III(B) identifies the
defects in the reasoning of the opinion; and Section III(C) argues that
those defects are the reason this area of law is in a state of disarray. Part
IV first illuminates the missteps of the Tarasoff court, and then argues
that the court’s failure to adequately address the elements of duty and
causation produced an insufficient basis for the subsequent codifications
of the Tarasoff duty. Finally, this article concludes that the fifty
jurisdictions within the United States must become more coherent so
that sound legal reasoning is established regarding the duty of therapists
in protecting third parties against the violence of their patience.
II. BACKGROUND
An in depth understanding of both the legal and factual underlaying
of Tarasoff are indispensable to an effective determination of how
Tarasoff laws developed. Therefore, this section first discusses the key
principles of tort law, and more specifically, the negligence principles,
which are pertinent to a mental health professional’s liability. Secondly,
this section details the horrific set of facts that was brought in front of
the California Supreme Court that led to a revolutionary holding, which
will also be described at length.

9. Holmes’ therapist was not ultimately held liable. On August 8, 2016, the Plaintiff voluntarily
dismissed her case against Fenton and Colorado University. Notice of Voluntary Dismissal of Case by
Plaintiff, Blunk, 13-cv-00080 (D. Colo. Aug. 11, 2016).
10. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 344-45 (Cal. 1976).
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A. Tort and Negligence Principles
Modern tort law can be traced back to Oliver Wendell Holmes, who
made one of the first persuasive arguments for tort liability based upon
ancient common law notions of “eye-for-an-eye” justice.11 Though tort
law has evolved drastically from its original form, even later
developments of tort law, such as negligence, are founded in this same
theory, termed “reciprocity.”12 Thus, the definition of “negligence”
incorporates the quintessentially human response that when a person
fails to adhere to certain standards set by society, there must be
retribution.13 Negligence is “[t]he failure to exercise the standard of care
that a reasonably prudent person would have exercised in a similar
situation.”14 The law that governs negligence claims is not uniform
across the United States; rather, each state has developed its own
common law that dictates how any single case may be resolved.
Nevertheless, a basic negligence claim in any jurisdiction has four
elements that must be proved by the plaintiff: (1) the defendant owed a
duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that duty; (3) causation;
and (4) the plaintiff was harmed.15 A failure-to-warn claim against a
mental health professional is a claim rooted in negligence; however, the
four elements detailed below have different implications for this specific
claim.
1. Duty
Duty is an existential element of negligence, and yet is an elusive
term to define.16 The notion of duty has developed considerably over the
years, and although courts are moving towards a more uniform
definition, its exact contours still provide a source of confusion and
disagreement among courts and legal scholars.17 Nowhere is this debate
11. M. A. Geistfield, Hidden in Plaint Sight: The Normative Source of Modern Tort Law, 91
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1517, 1519 (2016).
12. Id. at 1550-1561.
13. Id.
14. Negligence, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
15. Id.
16. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 470 So. 2d 1060, 1079 (Ala. 1984) (Torbert, C.J., dissenting)
(“Tort duties are difficult to judicially define or confine; although most courts are content with the
enunciation of standards, such as ‘reasonable care,’ in defining tort duties, wherever courts enunciate
particular concrete rules, the process becomes endless, with attempts to cover each fact situation
specifically as it arises, ultimately causing more confusion than clarity as the specific rules inevitably
conflict.”).
17. Peter Lake, Common Law Duty in Negligence Law: The Recent Consolidation of a
Consensus on the Expansion of the Analysis of Duty and the New Conservative Liability Limiting Use of
Policy Considerations, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1503, 1508 (1997).
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as eminent as in the context of whether or to what extent a
psychotherapist owes a duty to potential victims of patients.18 Beginning
with the basic premise of duty is helpful to form a complete
understanding of this confusion. Thus, this section explores the
Restatement of Tort’s definition of duty, the prevailing definition of
duty as espoused by Justice Cardozo, and an alternate view of duty, as
explained by Justice Andrews.
a. Restatement of Torts
The Restatement of Torts defines duty in terms of what an “actor” is
required to do.19 Section four of the Restatement explains that duty:
denotes the fact that the actor is required to conduct himself in a
particular manner at the risk that if he does not do so he becomes
subject to liability to another to whom the duty is owed for any
injury sustained by such other, of which that actor's conduct is a
legal cause.20
In the Restatement (Second), duty is not an element of negligence,21
rather it derives legal significance from its use in defining what
negligence means or what standard of care is owed.22 One scholar
summarily described the Restatement’s use of duty as a term “integrated
into the identity of other primary concepts.”23 The Restatement clearly
expresses that there is no general duty “to control the conduct of a third
person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another . . . .”24
However, there are two exceptions to this rule.25 First, a duty to a third
person is owed if “a special relation exists between the actor and the
third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third
person’s conduct.”26 The second exception, which is meticulously
analyzed in determinations of a mental health professional’s duty,
creates a duty where “a special relation exists between the actor and the
other which gives to the other a right to protection.”27
18. See e.g., Paul B. Herbert & Kathryn A. Young, Tarasoff at Twenty-Five, J. AM. ACAD,
PSYCHIATRY LAW 30:275–81 (2002).
19. Lake, supra note 17, at 1518.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
21. Id.at § 281.
22. Lake, supra note 17, at 1514.
23. Id.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 315 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
25. Id. at § 315(a)-(b).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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In many ways, the Restatement’s treatment of duty is deficient
compared to the intricate analysis courts typically engage in. This is
largely because duty was not given much weight as a tool by which
courts could limit liability until after the Restatement was published.28
Therefore, case law is responsible for developing duty into the concept
as we know it today.29 No person was responsible for this development
more than Justice Cardozo.30 His description of duty, articulated in a
case perhaps more iconic than Tarasoff—Palsgraf v. Long Island R.
Co—represents the view that most courts have since adopted.31
b. Cardozo on Duty
Justice Cardozo’s view of duty focused on a “zone of danger” and the
primary consideration was whether the plaintiff was foreseeable.32 More
specifically, according to Cardozo, duty extends only as far as the
reasonably vigilant eye would perceive an “orbit of danger.”33 For
example, in Palsgraf, Cardozo refused to extend a duty from the railroad
worker who inadvertently dropped a box of explosives to a woman who
was injured from the explosion despite being many sections away in the
station.34 Contrary to some former jurisprudence, Cardozo held that a
determination of liability was always anterior to a finding that a duty
existed between the parties.35
Cardozo’s espousal of duty, however, left many questions.36 A line of
California tort cases that interpreted and applied his notion of duty
created a multi-factor balancing test,37 which can now be seen in some
form in most states.38 The California Supreme Court has consistently
28. Lake, supra note 17, at 1512-13.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1510-1512.
31. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
32. Id. at 100-01 (“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.”).
33. Id. at 100.
34. Id. at 101.
35. Id. at 99.
36. Lake, supra note 17, at 1513.
37. Id. at 1516 (“Dillon, Rowland, Biakanja and particularly Tarasoff Link to the text of the note
have become famous and widely cited for several foundational points with respect to duty.”).
38. See e.g., Taylor v. Smith, 892 So. 2d 887, 891-92 (Ala. 2004) (“The existence of a duty is
determined by a number of factors, including (1) the nature of the defendant's activity; (2) the
relationship between the parties; and (3) the type of injury or harm threatened. The key factor is whether
the injury was foreseeable by the defendant.”); Wertheim v. Pima Cnty., 122 P.3d 1, 6 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2005) (“Courts traditionally fix the duty point by balancing factors, including the reasonable
expectations of parties and society generally, the proliferation of claims, the likelihood of unlimited or
insurer-like liability, disproportionate risk and reparation allocation, and public policies affecting the
expansion or limitation of new channels of liability.”); Gast v. Fountain, 870 P.2d 506, 508 (Colo. App.
1993) (“Several factors are relevant in making this [duty] determination including the risk involved, the
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laid out six factors which are dispositive to the question of whether a
duty exists:
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing
future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and
consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise
care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.39
c. Andrew’s Version of Duty
In his dissent in Palsgraf, Justice Andrews espoused a notion of duty
very different from that of Justice Cardozo.40 Rather than limiting
liability on the basis of whether the defendant owed some ethereal duty
to the plaintiff, Justice Andrews preferred to limit liability on a
causation determination.41 Duty was an inappropriate way to cut off
liability, according to Andrews, because “[e]veryone owes to the world
at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably
threaten the safety of others.”42 Thus, under his theory, there could
never be a finding that a defendant did not owe a duty to a plaintiff.43
Justice Andrews criticized Justice Cardozo’s “zone of danger” limitation
on duty as a defectively narrow construction of the word on the grounds
that negligence is a cause of action based on the relationships between
human beings.44 Andrews explained that there is a relationship not only
between a man and those he reasonably expects to injure, but also
“between him and those whom he does in fact injure. If his act has a
tendency to harm someone, it harms him a mile away as surely as it does
those on the scene.”45 Therefore, the key factor in determining if a
plaintiff has a viable negligence claim is a policy determination, coined
“proximate cause.”46 A later section discusses proximate cause in more
foreseeability and likelihood of injury as weighed against the social utility of defendant's conduct, the
magnitude of the burden required to guard against the injury, and the consequence of placing the burden
upon the defendant.”).
39. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976).
40. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101-05 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 102-03.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 102.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 354. Justice Andrews describes proximate cause indefinitely, referencing first as
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detail.
2. Breach
The second element a plaintiff must prove is that the defendant
breached the legal duty that was owed.47 Breach of duty is “the act or
omission, however broad or general, [that] must be averred to have been
negligently done; it will not suffice to say that due to defendant's
negligence, plaintiff was injured.”48 The determination of whether a
defendant breached the duty is, unlike that of whether a duty is owed, a
factual one made by the jury.49 Further, the reasonable care owed in
each case is the same; however, whether that duty was breached is a fact
specific inquiry that varies with each case.50 This element may be
proved through a myriad of ways. For example, a plaintiff may offer
evidence that the breach was a defendant’s failure to adhere to a
statute51 or to an industry custom.52
3. Causation
The third element a plaintiff must prove in a negligence claim is that
the defendant’s breach of duty caused the plaintiff’s harm.53 Typically,
in determining if the defendant’s conduct was the cause of the plaintiff’s
harm, two separate inquiries must be made: first as to the cause in fact
and, second, as to the proximate cause.54 Though these determinations
are not made uniformly across jurisdictions, there are some general
procedures that courts follow.
In establishing cause in fact, a plaintiff must show that but-for the
something “must be, at the least, something without which the event would not happen.” Id. He then
lists a number of factors determinative to proximate cause: The court must ask itself whether there was a
natural and continuous sequence between cause and effect. Was the one a substantial factor in producing
the other? Was there a direct connection between them, without too many intervening causes? Is the
effect of cause on result not too attenuated? Is the cause likely, in the usual judgment of mankind, to
produce the result? Or by the exercise of prudent foresight could the result be foreseen? Is the result too
remote from the cause, and here we consider remoteness in time and space.” Id.
47. Ladd v. San Mateo, 911 P.2d 496, 497-98 (Cal. 1996).
48. Walter G. Schwartz, Negligence Pleading: Alleging Defendants Breach of Duty, 35 CAL. L.
REV. 2, 269 (1947).
49. Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d 1170, 1172-73 (Cal. 2011).
50. Id.
51. Thomas v. McDonald, 667 So. 2d 594, 596 (Miss. 1995) (“Violations of statutes generally
constitute negligence per se”).
52. The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. L. INST. 1979).
54. Semi-Tech Litig., LLC v. Bankers Tr. Co., 353 F. Supp. 2d 460, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(“Causation of course has two major components: cause-in-fact, or ‘but-for’ cause, and proximate
cause.”).
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defendant’s negligence, the injury would not have occurred.55 Thus, for
example, where a plaintiff proved only that he might not have fallen off
a bridge if a railing had been built higher, he failed to prove but-for
causation.56 But-for causation is a jury determination, unless reasonable
minds could not differ.57
Proximate cause, however, is a legal determination reserved for the
judge.58 In jurisdictions that do not analyze the element of duty as the
primary limitation on liability, proximate cause stands in its place.59
This method is embodied in Justice Andrews dissent in Palsgraf.60 In
that case, Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority, held that “causation,
remote or proximate, is thus foreign to the case before us.”61 However,
because Justice Andrews asserted that duty incorporated a much broader
range of relationships, proximate cause was the appropriate way to cut
off liability.62 Proximate cause is a balancing of policy considerations
based on certain factors, which are dispositive as to whether the
defendant’s actions were too remote to be deemed the proximate cause
of the plaintiff’s harm.63
Factors that tend to demonstrate proximate cause are: (1)
establishment of but-for causation; (2) a natural and continuous
sequence between cause and effect; (3) the act was a substantial factor in
the result; (4) there was a direct connection, as opposed to intervening
events, between the cause and effect; (5) there was a high likelihood of
injury; and (6) the defendant could have foreseen that harm to the
plaintiff would have resulted.64 For example, after a consideration of
these factors, where a plaintiff burned herself carrying boiling water, the
court held a landlord-defendant was not liable because his failure to
provide heat was not direct enough to be considered the proximate cause
55. Cay v. Dep’t of Transp., 631 So. 2d 393, 396 (La. 1994).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 396
58. Brown v. Phila. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 760 A.2d 863, 868 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
“Proximate cause ‘is primarily a problem of law’ and ‘it is a Pennsylvania court’s responsibility to
evaluate the alleged facts and refuse to find an actor’s conduct the legal cause of harm when it appears
to the court highly extraordinary that [the actor's conduct] should have brought about the harm.’” Id.
Thus, proximate cause must “be determined by the judge and it must be established before the question
of actual cause is put to the jury.” Id.
59. See e.g., First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 769 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“Central to the notion of proximate cause is the idea that a person is not liable to all those who may
have been injured by his conduct, but only to those with respect to whom his acts were ‘a substantial
factor in the sequence of responsible causation,’ and whose injury was "reasonably foreseeable or
anticipated as a natural consequence”) (internal citations omitted).
60. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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of the plaintiff’s injury.65
4. Harm
The final element a plaintiff must prove before recovering monetary
damages is that he or she experienced some physical or emotional harm.
The Restatement of Torts frames this element as an “invasion.”66 A
comment in the Restatement states that there is a “requirement that the
interest which is invaded must be one which is protected, not only
against acts intended to invade it, but also against unintentional
invasions.”67 Thus, one limitation on liability through this element is
that the law does not generally provide recourse where a plaintiff
suffered only economic harm.68
Though there are minor variations within each jurisdiction, courts do
not generally stray from this general paradigm of a negligence action. Of
course, for every general rule, there are exceptions; one of which was
created by the Supreme Court of California in Tarasoff.
B. The Facts of Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California
At the time it was decided, Tarasoff was arguably the most expansive
application of Cardozo’s version of duty.69 To appreciate how the
Supreme California Court reached its holding, however, it is imperative
to be fully informed of the facts of the case, which are as catastrophic as
the holding was revolutionary. Thus, this section details the facts that
catalyzed the lawsuit and the resulting holding.
On October 27, 1969, Prosenjit Poddar killed Tatiana Tarasoff.70
Poddar and Tatiana first met in August 1968 at folk dancing classes
hosted by the university they both attended—The University of
California. The two began seeing each other regularly, and on New
Year’s Eve Tatiana kissed Poddar, who took this to be a sign that they
had become involved in a romantic relationship.71 However, Tatiana
disenchanted him of this belief when she informed him that she was

65. Laureano v. Louzoun, 560 N.Y.S.2d 337 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. L. INST. 1965).
67. Id.
68. 532 Madison Ave Gourmet Foods, Inc v Finlandia Center, Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1100-01
(N.Y. 2001).
69. Fillmore Buckner & Marvin Firestone, “Where the Public Peril Begins”: 25 Years After
TARASOFF, J. LEGAL MED. 21: 2 (2001) (“The majority’s expansion of that rule takes us from the
world of reality into the wonderland of clairvoyance”).
70. People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 344-46 (Cal. 1974).
71. Id.
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seeing other people and was uninterested in a committed relationship.72
This rejection caused him deep emotional distress.73 Poddar became
disheveled and reclusive; he let his health and schooling go by the
wayside; and he often spoke disjointedly and wept.74 Poddar met with
Tatiana multiple times throughout the spring and taped the meetings to
ascertain her reasons for not wanting a relationship.75
Poddar’s state continued to deteriorate until Tatiana left for South
America that summer.76 At the suggestion of a friend, Poddar began
seeing a therapist.77 During these sessions, Poddar revealed to his
therapist, Dr. Moore, his intentions of killing an unnamed girl readily
identifiable as Tatiana78 when she returned home from her trip in
Brazil.79 Unbeknownst to his therapist, Poddar had also convinced
Tatiana’s brother to share an apartment with him.80 In October, Tatiana
returned home from her trip and Poddar quit seeing his psychiatrist.81
Dr. Moore, with the concurrence of two other psychiatrists, wrote to the
campus police to recommend that Poddar be civilly committed because,
in his opinion, Poddar was suffering from acute and severe
schizophrenia and was a dangerous person.82
Three officers detained Poddar; however, satisfied that he was
rational and upon Poddar promising that he would stay away from
Tatiana, the officers released Poddar.83 The officers did not warn
Tatiana or her family of the potential danger posed against her.84 The
Director of the Department of Psychiatry at Cowell Memorial Hospital
directed that the note warning the police, along with any notes by
Poddar’s therapist, Dr. Moore, be destroyed, and that no action be taken
to detain Poddar.85
On October 27, 1969, Poddar went to Tatiana’s home but was turned

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 344-45.
77. Id.
78. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, ?? (Cal. 1976) (“Dr. Moore told
said officers that at a psychotherapy session on August 18 Poddar had informed Moore that he was
going to kill ‘an unnamed girl, readily identifiable as Tatiana Tarasoff, when she returned home to
Berkeley from Brazil’”).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Poddar, 518 P.2d at 344-45.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 341-42.
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away by her mother.86 Later that day, he returned to her home armed
with a pellet gun and a kitchen knife.87 This time, he found her alone.88
Tatiana refused to speak with him, and when he persisted she
screamed.89 Poddar shot her with the pellet gun and she took off from
the house; Poddar then pursued, caught, and repeatedly stabbed her until
she died.90 Poddar was convicted of second degree murder, but was
released five years later after a successful appeal of the jury
instructions.91 California declined to retry the case, contingent upon
Poddar’s relocation back to India.92
After the criminal trial, Tatiana Tarasoff’s parents filed a wrongful
death suit against a plethora of individuals.93 The defendants included
Dr. Moore, the psychologist who examined Poddar and decided that he
should be committed, the two psychiatrists who concurred in Moore’s
decision, one doctor who countermanded Moore’s decision and
suggested that no action be taken to confine Poddar, and, finally, the
three police officers involved in the detainment and release of Poddar.94
The Tarasoffs alleged multiple charges against the various parties for the
failure to detain Poddar and the failure to warn Tatiana; however, only
the failure to warn could withstand scrutiny, as the therapist and police
officer defendants could claim governmental immunity against the
failure to detain charge.95
C. The Decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California
The underlying issue the court resolved was whether the therapist
owed a duty to the potential victim of the patient’s violence.96 The court
began its discussion reiterating the general rule that:
whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position
with regard to another . . . that if he did not use ordinary care and
86. Poddar, 518 P.2d at 244-45.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Douglas Mossman, The Future of “The Duty to Protect:” Scientific and Legal Perspectives
on Tarasoff’s Thirtieth Anniversary: Article Critique of Pure Risk Assessment or, Kant Meets Tarasoff,
75 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 534 (2006).
92. Id.
93. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
94. Id. at 340 n. 2.
95. Id. at 352-53. The court additionally held that as “to the police defendants, we conclude that
they do not have any such special relationship to either Tatiana or to Poddar sufficient to impose upon
such defendants a duty to warn respecting Poddar's violent intentions.” Id.
96. Id. at 342.
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skill in his own conduct . . . he would cause danger of injury to the
person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care
and skill to avoid such danger.97
The court then identified certain situations that warrant departure
from the general rule.98 Although the court balanced a number of
considerations, the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff was foremost
in determining whether a departure was justified in this situation.99
Common law, however, limits this exception by requiring a special
relationship between the defendant and the dangerous person or the
potential victim.100 Finding the relationship between a therapist and a
patient sufficient to meet this requirement, the California Supreme Court
concluded that “such a relationship may support affirmative duties for
the benefit of third parties.”101
Determining what exactly the therapist’s duty required was a
contentious issue that was resolved in the court’s first opinion, though
according to defense advocates, with gross injustice.102 When the court
initially considered the issue, it imposed on therapists a specific duty to
warn potential victims of their patients’ threat.103 Consequently, the
failure of the defendant therapist to warn Tatiana or her family members
constituted a cognizable claim.104 An effort spearheaded by the Northern
California Psychiatric Society convinced the court to rehear the case.105
Eighteen months later, the court issued a second opinion which
purported to allay the concerns of the amicus curiae, who argued that
the duty to warn would have detrimental effects on the practice of

97. Id.
98. Id. Specifically, the court mentions that a “a hospital must exercise reasonable care to control
the behavior of a patient which may endanger other persons. A doctor must also warn a patient if the
patient's condition or medication renders certain conduct, such as driving a car, dangerous to others.” Id.
at 343-44.
99. Id. at 342. The other considerations include “degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
resulting liability for breach, cost and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 343-44.
102. Daniel J. Givelber, William J. Bowers & Carolyn L. Blitch, Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An
Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443, 449 (1984).
103. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P. 2d 553, 561 (Cal. 1974), overruled by Tarasoff,
551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). The complaints can also be amended to assert causes of action against the
police defendants for failure to warn on the theory that the officers' conduct increased the risk of
violence. Id.
104. Id.
105. Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, supra note 102.
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psychiatry.106 Consequently, to lessen the burden on therapists, the court
pronounced a less specific duty—that duty of “reasonable care.”107 The
court explained that “the discharge of this duty of due care will
necessarily vary with the facts of each case, in each instance the
adequacy of the therapist’s conduct must be measured against the
negligence standard of the rendition of reasonable care under the
circumstances.”108 The court further elaborated that if the duty of
reasonable care required a therapist to warn a potential victim, patienttherapist confidentiality would not constitute sufficient justification for
failing to do so.109 The court eloquently explained that “the protective
privilege ends where the public peril begins.”110
III. DISCUSSION
Perhaps unbeknownst to the California Supreme Court, its holding in
Tarasoff would have an impact that reached the opposite coast of the
United States and every state in between. This section first describes the
different ways Tarasoff impacted tort liability in various jurisdictions.
Secondly, it discusses the practical consequences of the severe
interjurisdictional variance.
A. Effects of Tarasoff
As each state wrangled with the implications of the newfound duty
created in Tarasoff, various positions emerged. These positions can be
categorized three main groups: duty states, permission states, and antiTarasoff states.111 This section describes the ways in which Tarasoff has
been codified across many jurisdictions and details some important
variations within each subgroup.
1. Duty States
When California itself codified the Tarasoff holding, it both limited
and expanded the court of appeal’s holding.112 First, it more clearly and

106. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d 334.
107. Id. at 345-46 (“once a therapist does in fact determine, or under applicable professional
standards reasonably should have determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others,
he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that danger”).
108. Id. at 349-50.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 347-48.
111. Herbert & Young, supra note 18, at 277.
112. Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92 (Lexis 2013).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

13

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 10

836

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 86

narrowly set out that a psychotherapist’s113 duty is triggered only when
“the patient has communicated to the psychotherapist a serious threat of
physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims.”114
However, the California Statute also explicitly required that when a
psychotherapist’s duty to a third party is triggered, that duty is
discharged when the therapist makes “reasonable efforts to
communicate the threat to the victim or victims and to a law
enforcement agency.”115 In so doing, the legislature placed a more
stringent requirement on therapists to warn specific people, whereas
under the Tarasoff holding no such duty was in place. California, along
with twenty-eight other states, falls under the category of a “duty
state.”116
The general formula for the duty espoused in these jurisdictions is
that a psychotherapist has a duty to warn either the victim or law
enforcement after a patient makes an explicit and specific threat of
physical harm.117 One important variation within these jurisdictions is
whether the state incorporates the therapist’s judgment into when the
duty is triggered.118 For instance, Idaho’s Tarasoff statute requires the
therapists to make a determination of whether the patient “has the
apparent intent and ability to carry out such a threat” before the
therapist’s duty to warn the victim is initiated.119 Other jurisdictions,
contrarily, impose a duty to warn almost as a functional matter

113. Interestingly, California uses this term differently than the American Psychologist
Association. Psychotherapy was previously a contentious area of the field, but has recently been
validated by the APA. According to the APA, psychotherapy is the informed and intentional application
of clinical methods and interpersonal stances derived from established psychological principles for the
purpose of assisting people to modify their behaviors, cognitions, emotions, and/or other personal
characteristics in directions that the participants deem desirable.” The only guidance provided in
California law regarding who constitutes a “psychotherapist" is found in the state’s rules of evidence,
which define psychotherapist the way that most states define the mental health professional. Recognition
of Psychotherapy Effectiveness, AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST ASSOCIATION (August, 2012),
http://www.apa.org/about/policy/resolution-psychotherapy.aspx (quoting Norcross, 1990, p. 218-220).
114. Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92. Arguably, subsequent interpretation of the language re-expanded
when the duty kicks in. See Barry v. Turek, 267 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (interpreting
this language to mean “whether [the plaintiff] has sufficiently shown that [the defendant] ought to have
been aware that [the patient] presented a serious threat of physical violence”).
115. Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92 (emphasis added).
116. National Conference of State Legislatures “Mental Health Professional’s Duty To Warn”
(Apr. 23, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/mental-health-professionals-duty-to-warn.aspx.
The other “Duty States” are: Washington, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, Nebraska,
Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Louisiana, Alabama, Tennessee, Kentucky, Illinois, Wisconsin, Michigan,
Indiana, Ohio, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Vermont, New
Hampshire, and New York. Id.
117. Herbert & Young, supra note 18, at 277.
118. Id.
119. Idaho Code § 6-1902 (Lexis 2016).
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whenever an explicit threat is made.120
2. Permission States
A second subgroup of jurisdictions are those which permit, but do not
require, a therapist to breach the duty of confidentiality to warn a third
party of the patient’s violence.121 A minority of sixteen states belong to
this group, which provides much more discretion in the hands of the
therapist.122 A key variation within this group, however, is how much
discretion the statute affords therapists.123 In Illinois, for example, the
therapist may disclose a patient’s communications “when, and to the
extent, in the therapist’s sole discretion, disclosure is necessary to warn
or protect a specific individual against whom a recipient has made a
specific threat of violence.”124 The subgroup with statute’s like Illinois’
essentially provide therapists with the ability to breach confidentiality,
while also providing immunity from third party claims when they chose
to remain silent.125
On the other side of the spectrum, within this group, there are states
that do not explicitly give discretion to therapists.126 Therapists in these
jurisdictions may not be able to escape liability to third parties because,
although the language of the statutes is permissive, it is possible that
courts may interpret this ambiguous language to impose some positive
duty to warn when the therapist receives a threat of physical violence.127
3. Anti-Tarasoff Jurisdictions
The final group contains an even smaller group of states. In fact, only
Nevada, North Dakota, Maine, and North Carolina have rejected a
Tarasoff duty.128 North Carolina has judicially eliminated the Tarasoff
duty, whereas the remaining states do not have explicit Tarasoff rules,
but strictly enforce confidentiality.129 In these states, mental health
120. See e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-1102 (LexisNexis 2015) (“A mental health professional
has a duty to warn of or take reasonable precautions to provide protection from violent behavior only if
the patient has communicated to the mental health professional an actual threat of physical violence by
specific means against a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable victim.”).
121. Herbert & Young, supra note 18, at 278-79.
122. Id.
123. Id. Other states with similar statutes are Oregon, New York, and Texas.
124. Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. Ch. 740, § 110/11(viii) (2015).
125. § 110/3.
126. Herbert & Young, supra note 18, at 279. These states include Alaska, Connecticut, the
District of Columbia, Florida, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. Id.
127. Id.
128. Supra note 116.
129. See Gregory v. Kilbride, 565 S.E.2d 685, 692 (N.C. 2002) (specifically not recognizing
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professionals are forced to make judgments about whether to warn
potential victims, attempting to balance their obligation to keep their
client’s information confidential with the fear of a potential lawsuit from
a victim of their patient.
B. Implications of Tarasoff Laws and the Need for Consistency
The drastic interjurisdictional variance of Tarasoff laws is cause for
concern. First, upon the recognition that states codified some version of
the Tarasoff to achieve some specific policy aims,130 one question
necessarily results: which state has the correct policy aim?131 Tarasoff
statutes govern matters of life or death, and it is consequently of the
upmost importance to determine which policy aim promotes the most
good. This inquiry dictates another serious inquiry—how to measure the
success of the Tarasoff statutes. The number of deaths Tarasoff has
prevented is, as a practical matter, impossible to quantify;132 however,
whether the implementation of a duty to warn effected the homicide rate
of the respective state has been studied.133 The results suggest that
Tarasoff laws may actually be counterproductive to the goal they set out
to achieve.134 In fact, one researcher found that imposing a mandatory
duty to warn on mental health professionals is associated with a five
percent increase in the homicide rate.135 Therefore, the majority position
imposing mandatory reporting may not necessarily represent the most
successful legislation.
Yet, another significant practical concern that cannot be overlooked is
the effect of the ambiguous and inconsistent Tarasoff laws on the dayto-day practices of mental health professionals. Foremost criticisms
against Tarasoff laws are questions regarding therapists’ ability to
determine whether a patient is indeed “dangerous” and the
corresponding risk of false positives.136 While some studies suggest
Tarasoff duty to protect in a case where a patient made an explicit threat to murder his wife and himself
in the thirty-six hours he was with his therapist leading up to the deaths).
130. Ronald D. Richards Jr. and Madhvi P. Richards, A Tale of Two States: Beware of Tarasoff
Extension for Hearsay Communications, 2(5) PSYCHIATRY (EGMONT) 40-6 (2005).
131. Herbert & Young, supra note 18.
132. Griffin Edwards, Doing Their Duty: An Empirical Analysis of the Unintended Effect of
Tarasoff v. Regents on Homicidal Activity, 57 J. LAW & ECON. 321 (2014) (explaining that his results
may be exaggerated if Tarasoff does prevent some murders, but unable to specify that effect).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Vanessa Merton, Law and Psychiatry Part II: Confidentiality and the “Dangerous” Patient:
Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263, 266-68 (1982); but see
Mossman, supra note 91, at 570 (introducing the argument that it is better to have ten people be detained
due to false warnings rather than one person be murdered because of a “false negative”).
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therapist feel confident in their ability to assess this risk, others present
this as a serious downfall to Tarasoff laws.137
A secondary source of discomfort among therapists caused by
Tarasoff laws is a sense of infringement on their professional
judgment.138 Specifically, therapists in strict jurisdictions find the
constraint Tarasoff laws impose on their discretionary abilities in how to
deal with patients who are “dangerous” to be unnecessarily limiting.139
It cannot be meritoriously argued that therapists in mandatory warning
jurisdictions are more competent in making this determination; thus,
imposing this requirement on only some therapists is justifiably seen as
an injustice. The variation in laws produces an element of
unpredictability that mental health professionals must endure, especially
in those jurisdictions that have not clearly codified the duty.
Lastly, the effects of the inconsistent Tarasoff laws on the
relationship between patients and their therapists must be
acknowledged. In fact, it is the degradation of this relationship that is
posited as the reason why mandatory warning states have an increased
homicide rate.140 The same unpredictability faced by therapists because
of the ambiguously codified duties will necessarily effect their patients,
as well. The symptoms of the disorderly state of the law are these
complications and to resolve the problem, it is vital to address not only
the symptoms, but the root cause. The remainder of this article posits
that the root cause of the inconsistent Tarasoff laws is the defective legal
reasoning utilized in Tarasoff itself.
IV. ARGUMENT
Though granularly analyzing the legal reasoning behind a decision
may appear to have theoretical implications only, Tarasoff demonstrates
the palpable effects that a mishap in analysis can have. This section sets
out those missteps of the Tarasoff court in finding that Poddar’s
therapist was subject to liability because of the murder of Tatiana
Tarasoff. It then argues that the court’s failure to adequately address the
137. See e.g., Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, supra note 102 (“Thus, therapists appear to believe that
there are objective professional standards for evaluating dangerousness or, at a minimum, that
dangerousness is a little like hard core obscenity in that they ‘know it when they see it,’ even if they
can’t define it.”); compare to Merton, supra note 136 (“Conceding the low reliability and questionable
validity of psychiatric diagnoses—what detractors have called psychiatric ‘labels’—some psychiatrists
maintain that susceptibility to error is even more pronounced in their prognoses, and most problematic
of all when their task is the prediction of violent behavior”).
138. Merton, supra note 136 (“What seems most disturbing to the psychiatrists who oppose the
Tarasoff doctrine, however, is not just their potential liability for wrong choices, but the infringement on
their professional discretion to make such choices.”).
139. Id. at 304-06.
140. Edwards, supra note 132.
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elements of causation and duty produced an insufficient basis for the
subsequent codifications of the duty found in Tarasoff. This section
accomplishes this by taking the Tarasoff reasoning to its logical ends.
A. What Tarasoff Got Wrong
There are two main flaws plaguing the Tarasoff decision. First, this
section argues that the opinion was erroneous due to the absence of a
discussion on the element of causation. Secondly, it posits that the
court’s analysis on the element of duty was, at best, incomplete.
1. Causation Analysis
Perhaps the most defective part of the court’s opinion in Tarasoff is
what is absent from it. Despite the court establishing that “Plaintiffs can
state a cause of action against defendant therapists for negligent failure
to protect,” it failed to discuss one of the four elemental parts to a
typical claim for negligence.141 Plaintiffs are typically required to prove
that the defendant’s misconduct was both the “but-for” and the
“proximate” cause of the harm;142 however, this causation requirement
was overlooked for the plaintiff in Tarasoff.
Whether causation could have been proved by the plaintiff in Tarasoff
is dubious. To conclude, notwithstanding the therapist’s failure to warn
Tatiana or her family, that the murder would have never happened is
speculative. It was entirely feasible that the therapist’s warning would
have been unsuccessful in preventing the horrific murder. Yet, the court
replaced this “but-for” causation analysis with a discussion of whether
the victim was a foreseeable plaintiff and rested its decision almost
entirely upon the affirmative answer to that question. To create a new
tort that departs from settled law and foregoes a basic tenet of the
underlying law without any justification was a questionable judicial
leap.
Perhaps an inclusion of Justice Andrew’s analysis of proximate cause
would have provided more stability to Tarasoff laws. As previously
established, Justice Andrews held that a determination of duty was an
improper basis to limit liability; instead, under his method, proximate
cause provided a more tangible method to deny a plaintiff’s claim. As
will become clear when this section takes Tarasoff to its logical ends, a
limit on the duty to protect third persons was the key element missing in
the decision. Rather than assuming that this element was met, requiring

141. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 349 (Cal. 1976).
142. Supra Part II(A)(3).
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the plaintiff in Tarasoff to prove that the therapist’s failure to take
reasonable care in protecting Tatiana was the cause of her death was a
potential limiting factor on liability. Yet, the court failed to engage in
any discussion of causation, establishing precedent for future claims to
similarly ignore this essential element of negligence.
2. Duty Analysis
In Tarasoff, the dispositive issue was whether Poddar’s therapist
owed a duty to warn Tatiana of her impending murder; therefore, the
bulk of the opinion was focused on duty. As mentioned previously, there
are many ways to perceive this intangible element.143 The Tarasoff court
adhered to the majority approach, embodied by Justice Cardozo’s
description of the term in Palsgraf, which described duty as the “sum
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.”144 Therefore, the court
perceived duty as the chief way to limit the liability of defendants in a
negligence claim.
The court departed from the “general principle” that a person has no
duty to control the conduct of another person, or to warn of that person’s
conduct.145 To justify the parting from well-settled law that this duty
existed only when the defendant had a special relationship between both
the potential victim and dangerous person, the court utilized various
tactics, some less persuasive than others. In doing so, the court
highlighted that other jurisdictions have held “that the single
relationship of a doctor to his patient is sufficient to support the duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect others against dangers emanating
from the patient’s illness.”146
The court found most persuasive a North Dakota case involving a
“dangerous mental patient.” There, the Veterans Administration (“VA”)
placed a man whom they knew to be dangerous to work with a farmer,
but failed to warn the farmer of the man’s mental health background.147
The farmer allowed the man to use his car, which the man used as
transportation to kill his wife.148 The North Dakota Court found that the
VA breached a duty notwithstanding the lack of a special relationship
between the VA and the wife.149
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Supra Part (II)(A)(1).
Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342 (quoting William L. Prosser, LAW OF TORTS 3d., 332-33 (1964)).
Id.
Id. at 344.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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This case is easily distinguishable from the facts of Tarasoff. Most
importantly, the VA did not have a duty to warn the wife of her potential
danger; rather, the VA was negligent in failing to inform the farmer of
the patient’s violent tendencies.150 The VA placed the patient in a
situation where the risk that he would cause great harm was greatly
increased, and failed to mitigate the risk they created.151 While there
may have been no special relationship between the VA and the victim,
there arguably was a special relationship between the VA and the
farmer, which was the foundation of the VA’s duty to warn the
farmer.152
In Tarasoff, however, the therapist had no role in creating a risk of
harm to a victim. The recipient of the warning was different in these two
cases. In Tarasoff, the required warning was from the therapist to the
victim, Tatiana, or a family member. In the North Dakota case, the
warning should have gone to the farmer who the VA placed the
dangerous man with. Thus, the court’s reliance on this case was
unpersuasive and did not provide sufficient justification for the
departure from the previously held limitation on duties to third persons.
Beyond a subsequent cite to a law review article, the court provided
no further legal justification for this unprecedented expansion of duty.153
Despite recognizing that duty is a compilation of policy considerations,
the court failed to discuss the previous policy justifications behind
limiting the duty to control third persons to situations where there exists
a special relationship between the defendant, the victim, and the
dangerous person.
Furthermore, the court did not grant sufficient validation to the
American Psychiatric Association’s (“APA”) policy concerns regarding
the expansion of a therapist’s duty. Instead, the court attempted to
alleviate qualms regarding a therapist’s ability to correctly identify
dangerous patients by explaining that requiring a therapist to assess the
dangerousness of a patient was the same standard other doctors are held
to in diagnosing any other physical disease.154 The court thus concluded
that a therapist may avoid liability merely by exercising the reasonable
care.155
Critics of Tarasoff suggest that the California Supreme Court was in
150. Merchs. Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d 334. “In their summary of the relevant rulings Fleming and Maximov
conclude that the ‘case law should dispel any notion that to impose on the therapists a duty to take
precautions for the safety of persons threatened by a patient, where due care so requires, is in any way
opposed to contemporary ground rules on the duty relationship.’” Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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no position to evaluate the APA’s amicus brief due to its lack of clinical
or specialized knowledge about the inner-workings of the relationship
between a therapist and a client.156 Others have argued that the court
oversimplified the reality of psychological disorders by simply
dichotomizing the question of dangerousness.157 Still, other analysts
have identified practical differences between other medical diagnoses
and dangerousness that cast doubt over the court’s analysis.158 The
medically technical issues are interesting and pose a serious
complication to the courts’ reasoning, but are beyond the scope of this
article, which purports to focus on the legal and analytic issues inherent
to Tarasoff. The court’s elementary comparison between mental health
and physical health professionals was also plagued by legal and analytic
implications, as well. Taking Tarasoff to its logical ends illuminates the
flaws of the decision.
3. Logical Extensions of the Tarasoff Duty
Tarasoff stands for the general proposition that when a special
relationship exists, a person has a duty to take reasonable steps to
prevent the misconduct of that person if that misconduct will likely
inflict harm to a third party. To demonstrate the potentially endless
liability that the espousal of duty found in Tarasoff could produce, it is
instructive to apply the analysis to similar situations. Imagine: a patient
with severe visual impairment tells an Optometrist that he intends to
drive his friend in the waiting room without wearing his glasses; a
patient tells a doctor about plans to operate heavy machinery on sleep
medicine; a drunk bar patron forewarns the bartender that she anticipates
driving a friend home. In each of these examples, Tarasoff suggests that
the optometrist, doctor, and bartender owe a duty to the third party to
156. See, e.g., Marin Roger Scordato, Post-Realist Blues: Formalism, Instrumentalism, and the
Hybrid Nature of Common Law Jurisprudence, 7 NEV. L.J. 263, 295 (2007) (“The judges may have no
direct experience whatsoever with psychiatrists or therapists, or their patients, or the therapeutic process.
Worse still, they personally may have had some direct personal experience with therapists and
psychiatric therapy and, as a result, be tempted to over-extrapolate from this very specific personal
experience to therapists and patients and therapy in general. Moreover, this utterly uncertain and wholly
random possession of specialized knowledge and experience regarding the activity affected by the legal
doctrine at issue characterizes as much the attorneys who develop and deliver the arguments to the court
as it does the judges who evaluate those arguments and ultimately decide.”)
157. Mossman, supra note 91, at 544 (“Tarasoff carries this dichotomization beyond the realm of
facts about the world - a patient either does or does not commit violence, a therapist either takes or does
not take protective action - to the realm of therapists' knowledge about those facts.”).
158. For example, there is less of a defined “standard of care” amongst mental health
professionals as compared to other medical fields. Furthermore, often times dangerousness does not
come with outward physical symptoms like many other diseases. Cynthia Grant Brown & Elizabeth
Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal Intervention in Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 549, 575 (1996).
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take reasonable steps to prevent the specific threatened harm.
Nowhere is the reasoning of Tarasoff more impactful than in the
context of sexually transmitted diseases, particularly for doctors of
patients with Acquired-Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). Utilizing
the rationale in Tarasoff, some plaintiffs have successfully sued the
doctors of the individual from who they contracted the disease.159 One
of the earliest of these cases came out of California, when a doctor failed
to inform the patient, herself, of her condition and she was therefore
unaware of the danger she posed to others by engaging in sexual
relations.160
As this liability has been structured on the framework established in
Tarasoff, it is unsurprising that the state laws for disclosing HIV/AIDS
status is similarly in disarray.161 For example, Massachusetts prohibits
the disclosure of a patient’s AIDS status162 whereas Maryland permits
the disclosure only if the affected patient refuses to inform sexual
partners of their condition.163 Interestingly, and in stark juxtaposition to
its stance on AIDS disclosure, Massachusetts is a mandatory reporting
state for mental health professionals who perceive a threat to a thirdparty’s life by a patient.164
One final example hones in on the disconcertingly ambiguous
limitation on the Tarasoff duty. As described in the introduction, after
James Holmes murdered innocent movie-goers in Colorado, his
therapist faced liability for breaching the duty she allegedly owed to her
patient’s victims. At the time of the shooting, the Colorado Tarasoff
statute imposed a duty on mental health professionals to warn threatened
individuals and law enforcement only when the patient made an explicit
and specific threat.165 At the criminal trial of James Holmes, his
159. Reisner v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (The patient
contracted the disease many years prior when she was mistakenly given tainted blood in a blood
transfusion. She died years later after engaging in a sexual relationship and transmitting the disease. The
patient’s sexual partner subsequently filed suit against the doctor.); see also DiMarco v. Lynch HomesChester Cnty, 559 A.2d 530 (Pa. Super. Ct.1989) (with substantially same facts and resulting liability
for the doctor).
160. Reisner, 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518.
161. See generally, Jacquelyn Burke, Discretion to Warn: Balancing Privacy Rights with the Need
to Warn Unaware Partners of Likely HIV/AIDS Exposure, 35 BOSTON COLL. J. OF LAW & SOC. JUSTICE
1-5(discussing the issues of Massachusetts’s duty to warn laws).
162. “A facility, as defined in section 70E, physician or health care provider shall not . . . disclose
the results of such test to any person other than the subject of the test without first obtaining the
subject’s written informed consent.” Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 111, § 70F (Lexis 2017).
163. Md. Code Ann. § 18-337 (2010). If an HIV-positive individual refuses “to notify the
individual’s sexual and needle-sharing partners, the individual’s physician may inform the local health
officer and/or the individual’s sexual and needle-sharing partner of: (1) The individual’s identity; and
(2) The circumstances giving rise to the notification.” Id.
164. Ann. Law. Mass. Ch. 123, § 36B (1989).
165. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-117 (superseded by amendment Jan 1, 2012). A therapist is free
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therapist, Linda Fenton, testified that Holmes’ threats were not
sufficiently specific to prompt any preventative actions;166 nevertheless,
she was forced to fight a lawsuit alleging a violation of the statute.167
This example demonstrates that imposing a limitation on duty based on
the specificity of the threat does not provide a clearly defined line of
where a therapists Tarasoff duty ends.
Colorado legislatures apparently agreed, and in response to the
Aurora shooting, amended its law.168 In a vain attempt to provide more
clarity, the statute was amended to expand a therapist’s duty to warn
when threats include less specific persons who are “identifiable by their
association with a specific location or entity.”169 As previously
discussed, one way to prove a breach of duty in a negligence claim is to
prove that a statute was violated.170 Colorado’s statute now does not
only expose therapists to liability if they fail to accurately predict the
dangerousness of a patient, but also if they fail to single out persons
“identifiable by their association.” Knee-jerk legislation that expands a
therapist’s duty to warn is likely to exacerbate the practical issues
discussed previously, especially considering amendments such as these
are not a product of sound legal reasoning but rather an explicit response
to tragedy.171
Proponents of the extended Tarasoff duty, such as the Colorado
legislature, cling to the notion that the duty-to-warn law promotes public
safety; however, empirical research casts doubt on the efficacy of
Tarasoff statutes. Other proponents rely on alternative barometers to
suggest a limit on the duty created in Tarasoff. They argue that in the
examples of the optometrist or bartender, the threat is not as likely to
produce death to a third party at the rate that a threat against life by a
from liability except “where the patient has communicated to the mental health care provider a serious
threat of imminent physical violence against a specific person or persons. When there is a duty to warn
and protect under the circumstances specified above, the duty shall be discharged by the mental health
care provider making reasonable and timely efforts to notify any person or persons specifically
threatened, as well as notifying an appropriate law enforcement agency or by taking other appropriate
action including, but not limited to, hospitalizing the patient.” Id.
166. Ann O’Niel, Psychiatrist: Holmes thought 3-4 times a day about killing, CNN (April 25,
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/16/us/james-holmes-theater-shooting-fenton/.
167. Tom McGhee, Theater shooting victim’s wife sues Holmes’ psychiatrist, DENVER POST
(April 25, 2017), http://www.denverpost.com/2013/01/15/theater-shooting-victims-wife-sues-holmespsychiatrist/.
168. “House Proposal Would Expand Duty to Report Threats” DENVER POST (April 26, 2017),
http://www.denverpost.com/2014/03/05/house-proposal-would-expand-duty-to-report-threats/
(The
Sponsor of the bill, representative Jovan Melton said, “So therefore if a threat is made toward one of our
schools, or a theater, or some other public place, the therapist will then be able to have the tools to work
with law enforcement and really protect our public interests and public safety.”).
169. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-117.
170. Supra Part (II)(A)(2).
171. Supra note 168.
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therapist’s patient does, and the duty to warn would consequently not be
triggered.172 Alternatively, it may be argued that in Tarasoff, the court’s
reference to the “sufficient involvement” of a therapist in the lives of
their patient as grounds to establish the duty is a limiting factor which
would prevent the expansion of duty beyond a therapist.
However, it is difficult to imagine creating a legal standard grounded
in either of the likelihood of death or the involvement of the parties.
These limits are not only arbitrary and lack definition, but they also
seem to require an offensively intense inquiry into the relationship
between a patient and doctor. Colorado’s recent expansion of its
Tarasoff law further demonstrates that limiting therapists’ duty
according to the specificity of their patients’ threat is a malleable and
unreliable standard. Applying Tarasoff in other contexts demonstrates
that there is no clear end to the duty it created; yet, looking back at the
opinion provides the source of the issue.
B. The Root Cause
The subsequent codifications of a therapist’s duty to potential victims
of their patients have roots in the Tarasoff opinion.173 Therefore, the
statutes themselves stand on unsteady ground as a consequence of
spawning from an opinion that suffers severe gaps in legal reasoning.
Specifically, it is the court’s failure to address causation and its inability
to establish a feasible limit on the duty, which has created the serious
discord among states as to when a therapist is liable to third parties.174
When statutes cannot be grounded in sound legal principles and there is
no clear policy goal, the result is, as demonstrated by the disarray of
Tarasoff laws, chaos.
VII. CONCLUSION
Though Tarasoff laws directly deal with the monetary liability
imposed upon a therapist, the implications of these laws are ultimately
matters of life and death. Therefore, the justifications behind them must
be carefully scrutinized. Unfortunately, neither the legal reasoning nor
172. Jeffrey E. Barnett, Ask the Ethicist: Is there a Duty to Warn When Working with HIVSOCIETY
FOR
THE
Positive
Clients?,
THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHOTHERAPY, http://societyforpsychotherapy.org/ask-the-ethicist-duty-warnworking-hiv-positive-clients/.
173. See, e.g., Timothy E. Gammon & John K. Hulston, The Duty of Mental Health Care
Providers to Restrain Their Patients or Warn Third Parties, 60 MO. L. REV. 749, 751-753 (1995)
(“Missouri courts have relied on the reasoning and conclusions in Tarasoff to formulate Missouri law
governing the duty a psychiatrist has to warn potential victims.”).
174. Supra Part (II)(A).
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the practical goals which purport to validate Tarasoff laws withstand
that scrutiny. The California Supreme Court’s rationalization for
imposing liability on the therapist in Tarasoff not only lacked any
discussion of causation, a necessary element of any tort, but also failed
to provide convincing justification for the expansion of the duty it
created. Worse still, it did not provide any feasible guidance on where
the limit of the new duty exists. The consequences of these flaws are
imminent.
This article does not set out to conclusively solve the issues that have
been created by Tarasoff, nor does it purport to adopt one state’s policy
as the best. Rather, this article’s purpose was to argue that the root cause
of the symptomatic disarray is the faulty legal reasoning utilized in
Tarasoff. Going forward, if some coherence among the fifty
jurisdictions of the United States is to be found, it is imperative to
employ sound legal reasoning to establish the duty of therapists to
protect third parties against the violence of their patients.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018

25

